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This study explores the long-run e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth
and social welfare in a two-country Schumpeterian growth model with cash-in-advance
constraints on consumption and R&D investment. We nd that an increase in the
domestic nominal interest rate decreases domestic R&D investment and the growth
rate of domestic technology. Given that economic growth in a country depends on
both domestic and foreign technologies, an increase in the foreign nominal interest
rate also decreases economic growth in the domestic economy. When each government
conducts its monetary policy unilaterally to maximize the welfare of only domestic
households, the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates are generally higher than the
optimal nominal interest rates chosen by cooperative governments who maximize the
welfare of both domestic and foreign households. This di¤erence is caused by a cross-
country spillover e¤ect of monetary policy arising from trade in intermediate goods.
Under the CIA constraint on consumption (R&D investment), a larger market power
of rms decreases (increases) the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal
nominal interest rates. We also calibrate the two-country model to data in the Euro
Area and the UK to quantify the welfare e¤ects of decreasing the nominal interest rates
from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal level.
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1 Introduction
In this study, we explore the long-run e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth and
social welfare in an open economy. Specically, we develop a two-country version of the
Schumpeterian growth model and introduce money demand into the model via a cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraint on R&D investment in each country.1 Empirical evidence supports
the view that R&D investment is severely a¤ected by liquidity requirements. For example,
Hall (1992), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Opler et al. (1999) and Brown and Petersen
(2009) nd a positive and signicant relationship between R&D and cash ows in US rms.
According to Bates et al. (2009), the average cash-to-assets ratio in US rms increased sub-
stantially from 1980 to 2006, and this increase is partly due to their increased expenditures
on R&D. Recent studies by Brown and Petersen (2011) and Brown et al. (2012) explain
this phenomenon by providing evidence that rms smooth R&D expenditures by maintain-
ing a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form of cash reserves. Furthermore, Berentsen et al.
(2012) argue that information frictions and limited collateral value of intangible R&D capital
prevent rms from nancing R&D investment through debt or equity forcing them to fund
R&D projects with cash reserves. We capture these cash requirements on R&D using a CIA
constraint. Given this CIA constraint on R&D, the nominal interest rate that determines
the opportunity cost of cash holdings a¤ects R&D investment, economic growth and social
welfare. In an open economy, monetary policy may also have spillover e¤ects across countries
through international trade.
The results from our growth-theoretic analysis conrm the above intuition and can be
summarized as follows. An increase in the domestic nominal interest rate decreases domestic
R&D investment and the growth rate of domestic technology. Given that economic growth
in a country depends on the growth rate of domestic technology as well as the growth
rate of foreign technology, an increase in the foreign nominal interest rate also decreases
economic growth in the domestic economy. When each government conducts its monetary
policy unilaterally to maximize the welfare of only domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium
nominal interest rates are generally di¤erent from the optimal nominal interest rates chosen
by cooperative governments who maximize the aggregate welfare of domestic and foreign
households. Specically, we nd that under the special case of inelastic labor supply, the
Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates coincide with the optimal nominal interest rates.
However, under the more general case of elastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium nominal
interest rates are generally higher than the optimal nominal interest rates because there
exists a cross-country spillover e¤ect of monetary policy. The intuition of this result can be
explained as follows. When the government in a country reduces the nominal interest rate,
the welfare gain from higher economic growth is shared by the other country through trade
in intermediate goods, whereas the welfare cost of increasing labor supply falls entirely on
domestic households. As a result, the governments do not lower the nominal interest rates
su¢ ciently in the Nash equilibrium.
The Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates depend on the market power of rms. Under
the CIA constraint on consumption, a larger markup reduces the wedge between the Nash-
1See also Chu and Cozzi (2013), who introduce a CIA constraint on R&D investment into a closed-economy
version of the Schumpeterian growth model and analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy.
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equilibrium and optimal nominal interest rates. This nding is consistent with the interesting
insight of Arseneau (2007), who shows that the market power of rms has a dampening e¤ect
on the inationary bias from monetary policy competition analyzed in an inuential study
by Cooley and Quadrini (2003). However, under the CIA constraint on R&D investment, we
have the opposite result that a larger markup amplies the inationary bias from monetary
policy competition. These di¤erent implications highlight the importance of the di¤erences
between the two CIA constraints. The main di¤erence between the CIA constraint on con-
sumption and the CIA constraint on R&D is that under the latter, an increase in the nominal
interest rate leads to a reallocation of labor from R&D to production. As a result, higher
nominal interest rates would be chosen by governments in the Nash equilibrium to depress
R&D as the negative R&D externality in the form of a business-stealing e¤ect determined
by the markup becomes stronger. In contrast, under the CIA constraint on consumption,
this reallocation e¤ect is absent because an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases
both R&D and production labors. Given that the economy features an undersupply of labor
due to the distortion of monopolistic competition, governments would reduce nominal in-
terest rates in the Nash equilibrium to increase labor supply as this monopolistic distortion
determined by the markup becomes stronger.
We also calibrate the two-country model to aggregate data in the Euro Area and the
United Kingdom (UK) to quantify the welfare e¤ects of decreasing the nominal interest
rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal level. We nd that the Friedman rule is
optimal (i.e., zero nominal interest rates maximize welfare). In this case, decreasing the
nominal interest rates in both economies from the Nash equilibrium to zero would lead to
nonnegligible welfare gains that are equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of
0.292% in the UK and 0.443% in the Euro Area. However, a unilateral deviation to decrease
the nominal interest rate from the Nash equilibrium would hurt the domestic economy and
only benet the foreign economy. For example, we nd that a unilateral decrease in the
nominal interest rate in the Euro Area would reduce its welfare by 0.028% but increase the
UKs welfare by 0.347%.
This study relates to the literature of ination and economic growth; see Stockman
(1981) and Abel (1985) for seminal studies of the CIA constraint on capital investment in
the Neoclassical growth model. Instead of analyzing the e¤ects of monetary policy in the
Neoclassical growth model, we consider an R&D-based growth model in which economic
growth is driven by innovation and endogenous technological progress. The seminal study
in this literature of ination and innovation-driven growth is Marquis and Re¤ett (1994),
who explore the e¤ects of a CIA constraint on consumption in a Romer variety-expanding
model.2 In contrast, we consider a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model and analyze the
e¤ects of monetary policy via a CIA constraint on R&D investment as in Chu and Cozzi
(2013).3 Huang et al. (2013) also analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy via CIA constraints
on R&D investment in a Schumpeterian model with endogenous market structure. The
present study di¤ers from the closed-economy analyses in Chu and Cozzi (2013) and Huang
et al. (2013) by considering a two-country setting with trade in intermediate goods across
2Chu, Lai and Liao (2013) provide an analysis of the CIA constraint on consumption in a hybrid growth
model in which economic growth in the long run is driven by both variety expansion and capital accumulation.
3See Chu and Lai (2013) for an analysis of the money-in-utility approach to model money demand in the
quality-ladder growth model.
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countries. This open-economy model allows us to explore the interesting implications of
policy coordination across countries and cross-country spillover e¤ects of monetary policy,
which are absent in a closed economy. To our knowledge, this is the rst study that analyzes
the e¤ects of monetary policy in a growth-theoretic framework that features R&D-driven
innovation in an open economy.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 documents stylized facts. Section
3 presents the model. Section 4 explores the e¤ects on economic growth. Section 5 analyzes
the e¤ects on social welfare. Section 6 provides a quantitative analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
In this section, we document the empirical relationship between ination and R&D across
countries. According to the Fisher identify, the nominal interest rate is equal to the sum of
the real interest rate and the ination rate. Fisher (1930) hypothesizes a one-for-one relation
between the ination rate and the nominal interest rate, and this is known as the Fisher
e¤ect in the literature. Although an exact one-for-one relation is unlikely to hold, subsequent
studies have provided empirical evidence for a positive long-run relationship between ination
and the nominal interest rate; see for example Mishkin (1992) who consider US data and
Booth and Ciner (2001) who consider European data. Our model also predicts a positive
steady-state relationship between ination and the nominal interest rate. Therefore, our
theoretical result of a negative e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on domestic R&D investment
implies a negative relationship between ination and R&D, which is consistent with the
following stylized facts. Figure 14 plots the relationship between ination of the consumer
price index and R&D as a percentage of GDP across OECD countries.5 To mitigate the
e¤ects of business-cycle uctuations, we take a 10-year average of each variable from 2000
to 2009.6 We consider all countries that are members of the OECD in this period.7
4Data source: World Development Indicators.
5Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) nd that 90% of R&D in the world is performed in OECD countries.
6We have also considered other years and found that the negative relationship is robust.
7In Figure 1, we have removed one outlier, Turkey, that had an average ination rate of 23.5%. However,
including this country would not a¤ect the negative relationship given that the average R&D share of GDP
in Turkey was also very low at 0.60%.
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3 An open-economy monetary Schumpeterian model
In this section, we develop an open-economy version of the monetary Schumpeterian growth
model. The underlying quality-ladder model is based on the seminal work of Grossman and
Helpman (1991).8 In summary, we modify the Grossman-Helpman model by introducing
money demand via CIA constraints on consumption and R&D investment as in Chu and
Cozzi (2013) and extending the closed-economy model into a two-country setting with trade
in intermediate goods. The home country is denoted with a superscript h, whereas the
foreign country is denoted with a superscript f . Both countries invest in R&D, but we allow
for asymmetry across the two countries in a number of structural parameters. Following a
common treatment in this type of two-country models, we assume balanced trade and labor
immobility across countries.9 Given that the quality-ladder model has been well-studied,
we will describe the familiar components briey but discuss the new features in details.
Furthermore, to conserve space, we will only present the equations for the home country h,
but the readers are advised to keep in mind that for each equation that we present, there is
an analogous equation for the foreign country f .
3.1 Households
In each country, there is a representative household. The lifetime utility function of the
household in country h is given by
Uh =
Z 1
0
e t

lnCht + 
h ln(1  Lht )

dt, (1)
where Cht denotes consumption goods in country h at time t. L
h
t denotes the supply of
labor in country h. The parameters  > 0 and h  0 determine respectively subjective
discounting and leisure preference. We allow for asymmetry in h across the two countries,
so that the countries may have di¤erent sizes of the labor force.
The asset-accumulation equation is given by
_V ht +
_Mht = R
h
t V
h
t +W
h
t L
h
t + T
h
t   P ht Cht +RhtBht . (2)
V ht is the nominal value of nancial assets (in the form of equity shares in monopolistic rms
in country h) owned by the household.10 Rht is the nominal interest rate in country h. W
h
t is
the nominal wage rate. T ht is the nominal value of a lump-sum transfer (or tax if T
h
t < 0) from
the government to the household. P ht is the price of consumption goods in country h. M
h
t
8See also Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for other seminal studies of the quality-
ladder model.
9In the case of the UK and the Euro Area, workers are legally mobile across countries, but there are
nonetheless cultural and language barriers as well as other costs associated with moving to a foreign country.
Given that we are essentially considering the R&D-intensive rich countries, like Germany and France, in the
Euro Area, it is not clear that the income di¤erences between the UK and these countries are large enough
to induce the majority of workers to move across countries.
10Here we assume home bias in asset holding (i.e., domestic monopolistic rms are owned by domestic
households) in order to allow the rates of return on assets to di¤er across countries.
5
is the nominal value of domestic currency held by the household partly to facilitate money
lending to R&D entrepreneurs subject to the following constraint: Bht + 
hP ht C
h
t  Mht ,
where Bht is the nominal value of domestic currency borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs to
nance their R&D investment, and h  0 parameterizes the strength of the CIA constraint
on consumption. As the household accumulates more money Mht , its money lending B
h
t
to R&D entrepreneurs also increases, and the rate of return on Bht is the nominal interest
rate Rht .
11 The household also accumulates money to facilitate the payment of consumption
goods that are purchased domestically.12
The household maximizes (1) subject to (2) and Bht + 
hP ht C
h
t  Mht , which becomes
a binding constraint. From standard dynamic optimization, the optimality condition for
consumption in country h is
P ht C
h
t =
1
ht (1 + 
hRht )
, (3)
where ht is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2). The optimality condition for labor
supply is
Lht = 1 
hP ht C
h
t (1 + 
hRht )
W ht
. (4)
Finally, the intertemporal optimality condition is
  _
h
t
ht
= Rht   . (5)
In the case of a constant nominal interest rate Rh, (3) and (5) simplify to the familiar Euler
equation _Cht =C
h
t = r
h
t   , where rht = Rh   _P ht =P ht is the real interest rate in country h.
3.2 Consumption goods
Consumption goods in country h are produced by a unit continuum of competitive rms
that aggregate two types of nal goods using a Cobb-Douglas aggregator13 given by
Cht =
(Y h;ht )
1 (Y h;ft )

(1  )1  , (6)
where Y h;ft denotes country hs nal goods that are produced with intermediate goods im-
ported from country f , and Y h;ht denotes country hs nal goods that are produced with
domestic intermediate goods. The parameter  2 [0; 1] determines the importance of for-
eign goods in domestic consumption. From prot maximization, the conditional demand
functions for Y h;ht and Y
h;f
t are respectively
Y h;ht = (1  )P ht Cht =P h;ht , (7)
11It can be shown as a no-arbitrage condition that the rate of return on Bht must be equal to R
h
t .
12In reality, consumers do purchase consumption goods in other countries using foreign currencies; however,
this represents a relatively small share of consumption expenditures of the average household. Therefore, in
this model, we do not consider the use of foreign currencies for the purchase of consumption goods in other
countries.
13We consider a Cobb-Douglas aggregator instead of a more general CES aggregator in order to allow Y h;ht
and Y h;ft to grow at di¤erent rates on the balanced growth path.
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Y h;ft = P
h
t C
h
t =P
h;f
t , (8)
where P h;ht is the price of Y
h;h
t , and P
h;f
t is the price of Y
h;f
t . The familiar price index of
consumption goods in country h is P ht = (P
h;h
t )
1 (P h;ft )
.
3.3 Final goods
Final goods Y h;ht and Y
h;f
t are also produced by a unit continuum of competitive rms.
Competitive rms in country h produce Y h;ht by aggregating a unit continuum of domestic
intermediate goods Xh;ht (i) for i 2 [0; 1]. The standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator is given by
Y h;ht = exp
Z 1
0
lnXh;ht (i)di

. (9)
Similarly, competitive rms in country h produce Y h;ft by aggregating a unit continuum of
foreign intermediate goods Xh;ft (j) for j 2 [0; 1]. The Cobb-Douglas aggregator is given by
Y h;ft = exp
Z 1
0
lnXh;ft (j)dj

. (10)
From prot maximization, the conditional demand functions for Xh;ht (i) and X
h;f
t (j) are
respectively
Xh;ht (i) = P
h;h
t Y
h;h
t =P
h;h
t (i), (11)
Xh;ft (j) = P
h;f
t Y
h;f
t =P
h;f
t (j), (12)
where P h;ht (i) is the price of X
h;h
t (i), and P
h;f
t (j) is the price of X
h;f
t (j). Finally, the standard
price index of nal goods Y h;ht is P
h;h
t = exp
R 1
0
lnP h;ht (i)di

, and the standard price index
of nal goods Y h;ft is P
h;f
t = exp
R 1
0
lnP h;ft (j)dj

.14 All these prices are denominated in the
domestic currency.
3.4 Intermediate goods
In country h, there is a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods indexed by
i 2 [0; 1]. In each industry i 2 [0; 1], there is an industry leader who dominates the market
temporarily until the arrival of the next innovation.15 The industry leader employs workers
in country h to produce Xh;ht (i) for sales in country h and X
f;h
t (i) for sales in country f .
16
The industry leaders production of Xh;ht (i) and X
f;h
t (i) uses the same technology except
for the presence of an iceberg transportation cost c 2 (0; 1) for Xf;ht (i). Specically, the
production functions are given by
Xh;ht (i) = (z
h)q
h
t (i)Lh;hx;t (i), (13)
14Derivations available upon request.
15This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect in the literature; see Cozzi (2007) for a discussion.
16In order to keep the analysis tractable, we do not consider production o¤shoring in this study; see Chu,
Cozzi and Furukawa (2013) for a North-South analysis of monetary policy with production o¤shoring.
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Xf;ht (i) = (1  c)(zh)q
h
t (i)Lf;hx;t (i), (14)
where fLh;hx;t (i); Lf;hx;t (i)g denote production labor for fXh;ht (i); Xf;ht (i)g. zh > 1 is the step size
of innovation in country h, and we allow this parameter to di¤er across countries. qht (i) is the
number of quality improvements that have occurred in industry i as of time t.17 The total
number of production workers employed in industry i of country h is Lhx;t(i) = L
h;h
x;t (i)+L
f;h
x;t (i).
Given (zh)q
h
t (i) in industry i, the leaders marginal cost functions for Xh;ht (i) and X
f;h
t (i)
are respectively
MCh;ht (i) =
W ht
(zh)q
h
t (i)
, (15)
MCf;ht (i) =
W ht
(1  c)(zh)qht (i) . (16)
Standard Bertrand price competition leads to markup pricing. The markup ratio is assumed
to equal the step size zh of innovation in the original Grossman-Helpman model. Here we
allow for variable patent breadth similar to Li (2001) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) by
assuming that the markup h > 1 is a policy instrument determined by the patent author-
ity.18 For simplicity, we focus on the case in which h = f = , and this assumption can be
partly justied by the harmonization of patent protection across countries as a result of the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) e¤ective since
1996.19 Furthermore, given that patent policy is not designed by the monetary authority in
reality,20 we treat  as exogenous when deriving optimal monetary policy.
Given the markup ratio , the price of Xh;ht (i) is
P h;ht (i) = MC
h;h
t (i) = 
W ht
(zh)q
h
t (i)
. (17)
Similarly, the price of Xf;ht (i) denominated in country hs currency is
EtP f;ht (i) = MCf;ht (i) = 
W ht
(1  c)(zh)qht (i) , (18)
where P f;ht (i) is the price of X
f;h
t (i) denominated in country fs currency, and Et denotes the
nominal exchange rate. Given (17), the amount of monopolistic prot from selling Xh;ht (i)
17It is useful to note that we here adopt a cost-reducing view of quality improvement as in Peretto (1998).
18To model patent breadth, we rst make a standard assumption in the literature, see for example Howitt
(1999) and Segerstrom (2000), that once the incumbent leaves the market, she cannot threaten to reenter
the market due to a reentry cost. As a result of the incumbent stopping production, the entrant is able to
charge the unconstrained monopolistic markup, which is innity due to the Cobb-Douglas specication in
(9) and (10), under the case of complete patent breadth. However, with incomplete patent breadth, potential
imitation limits the markup. Specically, the presence of monopolistic prots attracts imitation; therefore,
stronger patent protection allows monopolistic producers to charge a higher markup without the threat of
imitation. This formulation of patent breadth captures Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) seminal insight on
"breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price".
19See Grossman and Lai (2004) for an analysis of the harmonization of patent protection under TRIPS.
20See Chu (2008) for a discussion of the political process in determining patent policy in the US.
8
in country h is
!h;ht (i) =

  1


P h;ht (i)X
h;h
t (i) =

  1


P h;ht Y
h;h
t , (19)
where the second equality follows from (11). Similarly, the amount of monopolistic prot
(denominated in country fs currency) from selling Xf;ht (i) in country f is
!f;ht (i) =

  1


P f;ht (i)X
f;h
t (i) =

  1


P f;ht Y
f;h
t , (20)
where the second equality follows from country fs analogous condition of (12). Therefore,
the total amount of monopolistic prots (denominated in country hs currency) earned by
the leader in industry i is
!ht (i) = !
h;h
t (i) + Et!f;ht (i) =
  1


P h;ht Y
h;h
t + EtP f;ht Y f;ht

. (21)
Finally, wage income paid to industry is workers in country h is
W ht L
h
x;t(i) = W
h
t L
h;h
x;t (i) +W
h
t L
f;h
x;t (i) =
1


P h;ht Y
h;h
t + EtP f;ht Y f;ht

. (22)
3.5 R&D
Denote V ht (i) as the nominal value of the monopolistic rm in industry i 2 [0; 1] of country
h. Because !ht (i) = !
h
t for i 2 [0; 1] from (21), V ht (i) = V ht in a symmetric equilibrium that
features an equal arrival rate of innovation across industries within a country.21 In this case,
the familiar no-arbitrage condition for V ht is
Rht =
!ht + _V
h
t   ht V ht
V ht
. (23)
This condition equates the nominal interest rate Rht in country h to the rate of return per
unit of domestic asset. The asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic prot !ht , (b) potential
capital gain _V ht , and (c) expected capital loss 
h
t V
h
t due to creative destruction, where 
h
t is
the arrival rate of the next innovation in country h.
There is a unit continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by k 2 [0; 1] in each country,
and they hire R&D labor for innovation. In country h, entrepreneur ks wage payment to
R&D labor is W ht L
h
r;t(k). However, to facilitate this wage payment, the entrepreneur needs
to borrow Bht (k) = W
h
t L
h
r;t(k) units of domestic currency from the domestic household.
22
21We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et
al. (2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation
equilibrium in the Schumpeterian growth model.
22Given that this is wage payment to workers in the domestic economy, the wage payment is naturally
paid in domestic currency.
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Following Chu and Cozzi (2013), we impose a CIA constraint on R&D investment, and the
cost of borrowing is RhtB
h
t (k). Therefore, the total cost of R&D is (1 + R
h
t )W
h
t L
h
r;t(k). Free
entry implies zero expected prot such that
V ht 
h
t (k) = (1 +R
h
t )W
h
t L
h
r;t(k), (24)
where the rm-level arrival rate of innovation is ht (k) = '
h
tL
h
r;t(k). We follow Jones and
Williams (2000) to model a duplication externality in R&D that is commonly discussed in the
literature by assuming that 'ht = '
h(Lhr;t)
 h , where Lhr;t is aggregate R&D labor, 
h 2 [0; 1)
is the duplication externality parameter, and 'h > 0 is the R&D productivity parameter. We
allow f'h; hg to di¤er across countries. The aggregate arrival rate of innovation in country
h is
ht =
Z 1
0
ht (k)dk = '
h(Lhr;t)
1 h . (25)
For tractability, we will focus on the special case of h = 0 in the rest of the analytical
derivations;23 however, we will consider the general case of h 2 (0; 1) in the quantitative
analysis.
3.6 Monetary authority
The growth rate of the nominal money supply in country h is _Mht =M
h
t . By denition, the
real money balance in country h is mht = M
h
t =P
h
t , where P
h
t is the price of consumption
goods in country h. Therefore, the growth rate of mht is _m
h
t =m
h
t =
_Mht =M
h
t   ht , where
ht  _P ht =P ht is the ination rate of the price of consumption goods in country h. The
policy instrument that we consider is the nominal interest rate Rht , which is exogenously
chosen by the monetary authority in country h. Given Rht , the ination rate in country h is
endogenously determined according to the Fisher identity ht = R
h
t   rht where rht is the real
interest rate in country h and is determined by the Euler equation rht = _C
h
t =C
h
t + . Then,
the growth rate of the nominal money supply Mht in country h is endogenously determined
according to _Mht =M
h
t = _m
h
t =m
h
t +
h
t .
24 Finally, the monetary authority in country h returns
the seigniorage revenue as a lump-sum transfer T ht = _M
h
t to the domestic household.
3.7 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fLht ; Lft ; Cht ; Cft ; Y h;ht ; Y h;ft ; Y f;ft ; Y f;ht ; Xh;ht (i);
Xh;ft (j); X
f;f
t (j); X
f;h
t (i); L
h
x;t(i); L
f
x;t(j); L
h
r;t(k); L
f
r;t(k)g1t=0, a time path of prices fW ht ;W ft ; P ht ;
23Under h 2 (0; 1), there does not exist a closed-form solution for the equilibrium labor allocations.
24In the long run, the Fisher identity simplies to Rht = r
h
t +
h
t = + _M
h
t =M
h
t implying that the monetary
authority could target the nominal interest rate via money growth (and ination). It is also useful to note
that in the model, it is the growth rate of the money supply that a¤ects the real economy in the long run,
and a one-time change in the level of money supply has no long-run e¤ect on the real economy. This is the
well-known distinction between the neutrality and superneutrality of money. Empirical evidence generally
favors neutrality and rejects superneutrality, consistent with our model; see Fisher and Seater (1993) for a
discussion on the neutrality and superneutrality of money.
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P ft ; P
h;h
t ; P
h;f
t ; P
f;f
t ; P
f;h
t ; P
h;h
t (i); P
h;f
t (j); P
f;f
t (j); P
f;h
t (i); V
h
t ; V
f
t ; Etg1t=0 and a time path of
policies fRht ; Rft ; T ht ; T ft g1t=0. Also, at each instance of time,
 the representative household in country hmaximizes lifetime utility taking fRht ;W ht ; P ht ; T ht g
as given;
 the representative household in country f maximizes lifetime utility taking fRft ;W ft ; P ft ; T ft g
as given;
 competitive consumption-good rms in country h produce fCht g to maximize prot
taking fP ht ; P h;ht ; P h;ft g as given;
 competitive consumption-good rms in country f produce fCft g to maximize prot
taking fP ft ; P f;ft ; P f;ht g as given;
 competitive nal-good rms in country h produce fY h;ht ; Y h;ft g to maximize prot tak-
ing fP h;ht ; P h;ft ; P h;ht (i); P h;ft (j)g as given;
 competitive nal-good rms in country f produce fY f;ft ; Y f;ht g to maximize prot tak-
ing fP f;ft ; P f;ht ; P f;ft (j); P f;ht (i)g as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-good rm i 2 [0; 1] in country h produces fXh;ht (i); Xf;ht (i)g
and chooses fP h;ht (i); P f;ht (i)g to maximize prot taking fW ht g as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-good rm j 2 [0; 1] in country f produces fXf;ft (j); Xh;ft (j)g
and chooses fP f;ft (j); P h;ft (j)g to maximize prot taking fW ft g as given;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs k 2 [0; 1] in country h employ fLhr;t(k)g to maximize
expected prot taking fRht ;W ht ; V ht g as given;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs k 2 [0; 1] in country f employ fLfr;t(k)g to maximize
expected prot taking fRft ;W ft ; V ft g as given;
 the market-clearing condition for labor holds in both countries such that Lhx;t+Lhr;t = Lht
and Lfx;t + L
f
r;t = L
f
t ; and
 the value of trade in intermediate goods is balanced such that R 1
0
P h;ft (j)X
h;f
t (j)dj =
Et
R 1
0
P f;ht (i)X
f;h
t (i)di.
3.8 Aggregate economy
Substituting (13) into (9) yields the aggregate production function for nal goods Y h;ht given
by
Y h;ht = Z
h
t L
h;h
x;t , (26)
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where aggregate technology Zht in country h is dened as
Zht  exp
Z 1
0
qht (i)di ln z
h

= exp
Z t
0
hd ln z
h

. (27)
The second equality of (27) applies the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating the log of (27)
with respect to t yields the growth rate of aggregate technology in country h given by
_Zht
Zht
= ht ln z
h = ('h ln zh)Lhr;t. (28)
Similarly, substituting country fs analogous condition of (14) into (10) yields the aggregate
production function for nal goods Y h;ft given by
Y h;ft = (1  c)Zft Lh;fx;t , (29)
where aggregate technology Zft in country f is dened as
Zft  exp
Z 1
0
qft (j)dj ln z
f

= exp
Z t
0
fd ln z
f

. (30)
Di¤erentiating the log of (30) with respect to t yields the growth rate of aggregate technology
in country f given by
_Zft
Zft
= ft ln z
f = ('f ln zf )Lfr;t. (31)
As for the dynamics of the model, Proposition 1 shows that the economy jumps to a
unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path (BGP). On the BGP, the allocations
of labor in both countries are stationary. Therefore, taking the log of (6) and di¤erentiating
it with respect to t yields the balanced growth rate of consumption goods Cht in country h
given by
_Cht
Cht
= (1 )
_Y h;ht
Y h;ht
+
_Y h;ft
Y h;ft
= (1 )
_Zht
Zht
+
_Zft
Zft
= (1 )('h ln zh)Lhr +('f ln zf )Lfr . (32)
Proposition 1 Given constant nominal interest rates fRh; Rfg in the two countries, the
economy immediately jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path along
which each variable grows at a constant (possibly zero) rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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3.9 Equilibrium labor allocations
In this subsection, we sketch out the derivations of the equilibrium labor allocations in
country h and relegate the detailed proof to Appendix A. From (24), the free-entry condition
in the R&D sector becomes 'hV ht = (1 + R
h)W ht , where the value of an innovation is
V ht = !
h
t =( + 
h) = !ht =( + '
hLhr ) on the BGP as implied by (23), (25) and the Euler
equation rht = _C
h
t =C
h
t + . Then, substituting !
h
t from (21) and W
h
t from (22) into the R&D
free-entry condition, we derive the following equilibrium relationship between Lhr and L
h
x:
Lhr =
  1
1 +Rh
Lhx  

'h
. (33)
The second condition is the households labor supply function in (4), which can be reex-
pressed as
Lh = 1  h(1 + hRh)Lhx. (34)
The third condition for solving the equilibrium labor allocations is the resource constraint
on labor given by
Lhx + L
h
r = L
h, (35)
where Lhx = L
h;h
x +L
f;h
x . Finally, we combine the conditional demand functions in (7) and (8)
with (22) and the balanced-trade condition that can be reexpressed as P h;ft Y
h;f
t = EtP f;ht Y f;ht
to solve for the following equilibrium relationship between Lh;hx and L
f;h
x :
25
Lf;hx =

1  L
h;h
x . (36)
Solving (33)-(36), we derive the equilibrium labor allocations in country h.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium labor allocations in country h are given by
Lhr =
  1
+Rh + h(1 + hRh)(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

  
'h
, (37)
Lh;hx = (1  )Lhx =
(1  )(1 +Rh)
+Rh + h(1 + hRh)(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

, (38)
Lf;hx = L
h
x =
(1 +Rh)
+Rh + h(1 + hRh)(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

, (39)
Lh = 1  
h(1 + hRh)(1 +Rh)
+Rh + h(1 + hRh)(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

. (40)
Proof. See Appendix A.
25To be more precise, we need to use (7), (8), (11)-(14), (17), (18) and (22).
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4 E¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates on
economic growth. Equation (37) shows that R&D labor Lhr is decreasing in the domestic
nominal interest rate Rh through the CIA constraints on R&D investment and consumption.
Given the CIA constraint on R&D investment, an increase in the domestic nominal interest
rate Rh increases the nancing cost of R&D, and hence, it has a direct negative e¤ect on R&D
labor Lhr . This nancing-cost channel via the CIA constraint on R&D investment is present
regardless of whether labor supply is elastic (i.e., h > 0) or inelastic (i.e., h = 0). Under the
CIA constraint on consumption, the negative e¤ect of the domestic nominal interest rate Rh
on R&D operates through elastic labor supply. Equation (40) shows that labor supply Lh is
decreasing in the nominal interest rate Rh partly due to the CIA constraint on consumption
(i.e., h > 0). In other words, an increase in the domestic nominal interest rate raises the
cost of consumption and causes the household to increase leisure. The resulting decrease
in labor supply Lh in turn reduces R&D labor Lhr . This labor-supply channel via the CIA
constraint on consumption is present only if labor supply is elastic (i.e., h > 0). Given
that R&D labor Lhr is decreasing in the domestic nominal interest rate, the growth rate of
technology in country h is also decreasing in the domestic nominal interest rate Rh; in other
words,
@ _Zht =Z
h
t
@Rh
= ('h ln zh)
@Lhr
@Rh
< 0. (41)
Equation (37) also shows that R&D labor is independent of the foreign nominal interest
rate Rf . Therefore, the growth rate of technology in country h must be also independent of
Rf ; in other words,
@ _Zht =Z
h
t
@Rf
= ('h ln zh)
@Lhr
@Rf
= 0. (42)
Nevertheless, economic growth in country h (i.e., the growth rate of consumption goods) is
decreasing in the foreign nominal interest rate Rf . To see this result, we rst write down
country fs analogous expression of (37) for the equilibrium allocation of R&D labor Lfr
given by
Lfr =
  1
+Rf + f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

  
'f
, (43)
which is decreasing in the foreign nominal interest rate Rf . Therefore, the growth rate of
consumption goods in country h is decreasing in the foreign nominal interest rate Rf through
the growth rate of foreign technology; in other words,
@gh
@Rf
= (1  )('h ln zh)@L
h
r
@Rf
+ ('f ln zf )
@Lfr
@Rf
= ('f ln zf )
@Lfr
@Rf
< 0, (44)
where gh  _Cht =Cht . The growth rate of consumption goods in country h is also decreasing
in the domestic nominal interest rate Rh through the growth rate of domestic technology; in
other words,
@gh
@Rh
= (1  )('h ln zh)@L
h
r
@Rh
+ ('f ln zf )
@Lfr
@Rh
= (1  )('h ln zh)@L
h
r
@Rh
< 0. (45)
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As foreign goods become more important in domestic consumption (i.e., a larger ), the
negative growth e¤ect of the foreign nominal interest rate becomes stronger, whereas the
negative growth e¤ect of the domestic nominal interest rate becomes weaker. Proposition 3
summarizes the above results.
Proposition 3 The growth rate of domestic technology is decreasing in the domestic nominal
interest rate but independent of the foreign nominal interest rate. The growth rate of foreign
technology is decreasing in the foreign nominal interest rate but independent of the domestic
nominal interest rate. The growth rate of domestic consumption is decreasing in both the
domestic and foreign nominal interest rates. The relative magnitude of these negative growth
e¤ects of the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates depends on  (i.e., the importance
of foreign goods in domestic consumption).
Proof. Proven in text.
Using the Fisher identity h = Rh  rh and the Euler equation rh = gh + , we can write
down an expression for the equilibrium ination rate given by h = Rh   gh(Rh)  , where
gh is decreasing in the nominal interest rate Rh. Therefore, di¤erentiating h with respect
to Rh yields
@h
@Rh
= 1  @g
h
@Rh|{z}
 
> 0.
It is important for us to emphasize that this comparative statics refers to a long-run relation-
ship between ination and the nominal interest rate.26 Together with Proposition 3, we have
the following empirical implications. First, an increase in the nominal interest rate requires
an increase in the ination rate and causes a decrease in R&D investment. This nding
is consistent with the stylized facts documented in Section 2 and the empirical evidence in
Chu and Lai (2013). Second, an increase in the nominal interest rate requires an increase
in the ination rate and causes a decrease in the growth rate of technology. This nding is
consistent with the empirical results in Bruno and Easterly (1998), who provide evidence for
a negative relationship between ination and the growth rate of total factor productivity.
Finally, an increase in the nominal interest rate requires an increase in the ination rate and
causes a decrease in the growth rate of output. This negative relationship between ination
and economic growth is supported by the empirical results in Vaona (2012).
26As mentioned before, Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001) provide empirical evidence for a
positive long-run relationship between ination and the nominal interest rate. Given that we consider a
long-run equilibrium, we have purposefully ignored important business cycle issues - in which ination t can
diverge from its target level, denoted as t , and aggregate output yt can diverge from its full-employment
trend level, denoted as yt . Nevertheless, it could be useful to compare the properties of our monetary
framework with that of the seminal Taylor rule: Rt = r + t + a (t   ) + ay (yt   yt ), in which r is
the long-run equilibrium real interest rate and a and ay are the (positive) monetary policy parameters. On
the one hand, the Taylor rule generally implies a negative relationship between the target ination rate and
the nominal interest rate when ination does not immediately adjust to the target rate. On the other hand,
our model implies a positive long-run relationship as a result of the Fisher identity: R = r + . These
contrasting implications are clearly due to the di¤erent time horizons of the two approaches; however, it is
well-known that in the long-run the Taylor rule coincides with the Fisher identity.
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5 E¤ects of monetary policy on social welfare
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates on
social welfare. Given the balanced-growth behavior of the economy, the lifetime utility of
the representative household in country h simplies to
Uh =
1


lnCh0 +
gh

+ h ln(1  Lh)

. (46)
Substituting (6), (26), (29) and (32) into (46) and then dropping the exogenous terms (in-
cluding Zh0 and Z
f
0 ) yield
Uh = (1 ) lnLh;hx + lnLh;fx +
(1  )('h ln zh)

Lhr +
('f ln zf )

Lfr + 
h ln(1 Lh). (47)
The analogous condition of (39) in country f implies that Lh;fx is given by
Lh;fx =
(1 +Rf )
+Rf + f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

, (48)
which depends on the foreign nominal interest rate Rf . In summary, the set of variables
fLh;hx ; Lhr ; Lhg in (47) depends on the domestic nominal interest rate Rh, whereas the set of
variables fLh;fx ; Lfrg depends on the foreign nominal interest rate Rf .
In the following subsections, we will derive (a) the nominal interest rate that is unilaterally
chosen by each government to maximize domestic welfare and (b) the nominal interest rates
that are chosen by cooperative governments who maximize the aggregate welfare of the two
countries. Given that the results di¤er under the following three scenarios,27 we analyze
them separately. In Section 5.1, we consider the case of inelastic labor supply. In Section
5.2, we consider elastic labor supply with only the CIA constraint on R&D investment. In
Section 5.3, we consider elastic labor supply with only the CIA constraint on consumption.
5.1 Inelastic labor supply
In this subsection, we consider the case of inelastic labor supply (i.e., h = f = 0). In this
case, (37), (38), (43) and (48) simplify to
Lhr =
  1
+Rh

1 +

'h

  
'h
, (49)
Lh;hx =
(1  )(1 +Rh)
+Rh

1 +

'h

, (50)
Lfr =
  1
+Rf

1 +

'f

  
'f
, (51)
27Unfortunately, there does not exist a closed-form solution for the welfare-maximizing nominal interest
rate in the most general case of elastic labor supply with CIA constraints on both R&D and consumption.
We will analyze this scenario in the quantitative analysis.
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Lh;fx =
(1 +Rf )
+Rf

1 +

'f

, (52)
and Lh = 1. Due to inelastic labor supply, the e¤ect of the nominal interest rate operates
solely through the CIA constraint on R&D investment. Substituting (49)-(52) into (47) and
then di¤erentiating Uh with respect to Rh, we obtain the following domestic nominal interest
rate that is unilaterally chosen by the government in country h to maximize the domestic
households welfare:
Rhne = max

  
h

h   1 ; 0

, (53)
where 
h  (1 + 'h=) ln zh > 1.28 Equation (53) also takes into account the zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rate, which would be binding if 
h > . The analogous foreign
nominal interest rate that is unilaterally chosen by country fs government to maximize the
welfare of the household in country f is given by
Rfne = max

  
f

f   1 ; 0

, (54)
where 
f  (1 + 'f=) ln zf > 1.29 The comparative statics are quite intuitive. Recall that
domestic R&D investment is decreasing in the domestic nominal interest rate. Therefore,
a larger innovation step size zh (zf) would decrease the nominal interest rate Rhne (R
f
ne)
because R&D has a larger social benet in this case. Similarly, a higher R&D productivity
'h ('f) would also decrease Rhne (R
f
ne) for the same reason. In contrast, a higher discount
rate  would increase Rhne and R
f
ne because R&D that leads to economic growth has a smaller
social benet when households discount future consumption more heavily.
We refer to the pair fRhne; Rfneg as the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates because
each government pursues its own objective taking the other governments action as given.
An interesting observation is that Rfne is also the foreign nominal interest rate that would
be preferred by the government in country h. To see this result, we di¤erentiate Uh with
respect to Rf and nd that the optimal foreign nominal interest rate for country h is also Rfne.
Finally, we consider cooperative governments who choose fRh; Rfg to maximize aggregate
welfare dened as Uh+U f , and we refer to these nominal interest rates as the optimal nominal
interest rates denoted as fRh ; Rfg. We nd that fRh ; Rfg = fRhne; Rfneg; in other words,
the unilateral action of each government gives rise to an internationally optimal outcome;
however, in the next subsection, we will show that this special result is due to the restriction
of inelastic labor supply. We summarize the above results in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Under inelastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate uni-
laterally chosen by each government coincides with the optimal nominal interest rate chosen
by cooperative governments who maximize aggregate welfare of the two countries. The opti-
mal nominal interest rate in each country is decreasing in the domestic step size of innovation
and domestic R&D productivity but increasing in the discount rate.
28In Appendix B, we derive the rst-best allocation of R&D labor in country h and show that the parameter
restriction on this optimal R&D labor to be positive also implies 
h > 1.
29We show in Appendix B that this parameter restriction holds for a similar reason as 
h > 1.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
5.2 Elastic labor supply with CIA on R&D only
In this subsection, we consider the case of elastic labor supply with the CIA constraint on
R&D. However, we remove the CIA constraint on consumption by setting h = f = 0. In
this case, (37), (38), (40), (43) and (48) simplify to
Lhr =
  1
+Rh + h(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

  
'h
, (55)
Lh;hx =
(1  )(1 +Rh)
+Rh + h(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

, (56)
Lh = 1  
h(1 +Rh)
+Rh + h(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

, (57)
Lfr =
  1
+Rf + f (1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

  
'f
, (58)
Lh;fx =
(1 +Rf )
+Rf + f (1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

. (59)
Substituting these conditions into (47) and then di¤erentiating Uh with respect to Rh, we
obtain the following domestic nominal interest rate that is unilaterally chosen by the gov-
ernment in country h to maximize the domestic households welfare:
Rhne = max

  h
h   1 ; 0

, (60)
where30
h  1  
1   + h

1 +
'h


(1 + h) ln zh   h > 1.
The analogous foreign nominal interest rate that is unilaterally chosen by country fs gov-
ernment to maximize the welfare of the household in country f is given by
Rfne = max

  f
f   1 ; 0

, (61)
where31
f  1  
1   + f

1 +
'f


(1 + f ) ln zf   f > 1.
30In Appendix B, we derive the condition under which this parameter restriction holds.
31In Appendix B, we derive the condition under which this parameter restriction holds.
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We also consider cooperative governments who choose fRh; Rfg to maximize aggregate wel-
fare Uh + U f , and these optimal nominal interest rates are given by
Rh = max

 	h
	h   1 ; 0

, (62)
Rf = max

 	f
	f   1 ; 0

, (63)
where32
	h  1
1 + h

1 +
'h


(1 + h) ln zh   h > 1,
	f  1
1 + f

1 +
'f


(1 + f ) ln zf   f > 1.
We see that 	h > h and 	f > f because  > 0; therefore, Rh  Rhne and Rf  Rfne.
In other words, the unilateral action of each government generally leads to excessively high
nominal interest rates in the Nash equilibrium due to a cross-country spillover e¤ect of
monetary policy under elastic labor supply, and the degree of this cross-country spillover
e¤ect is measured by  (i.e., the importance of foreign goods in domestic consumption).
Intuitively, when a country lowers its nominal interest rate, the welfare gain from higher
economic growth is shared by the other country, whereas the welfare cost of increasing labor
supply (Lh in (57) is decreasing in Rh) falls entirely on the domestic household. As a result,
the government does not lower the domestic nominal interest rate su¢ ciently in the Nash
equilibrium. In contrast, cooperative governments would internalize the welfare gain from a
higher growth rate in the other country. We summarize these results in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Under elastic labor supply with only a CIA constraint on R&D, the Nash-
equilibrium nominal interest rate unilaterally chosen by each government is higher than the
optimal nominal interest rate chosen by cooperative governments who maximize aggregate
welfare of the two countries. The Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates are increasing in
, whereas the optimal nominal interest rates are independent of .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Substituting h into Rhne in (60), we nd that R
h
ne is increasing in the markup . Sim-
ilarly, substituting 	h into Rh in (62), we nd that R
h
 is also increasing in the markup .
Intuitively, a larger markup strengthens the negative R&D externality, commonly known
as the business-stealing e¤ect, in the Schumpeterian growth model. To see this externality
e¤ect, (55) shows that Lhr is increasing in , whereas (56) and (59) show that L
h;h
x and L
h;f
x
are decreasing in . Given that  determines the private benet of R&D but not its social
benet, a larger  causes an increase in Lhr relative to its socially optimal level capturing the
32In Appendix B, we derive the rst-best allocations of R&D labor in countries h and f and show that
the parameter restrictions on these optimal R&D labors to be positive also imply 	h > 1 and 	f > 1.
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e¤ect of a negative R&D externality. As a result of this stronger negative R&D externality,
the government would raise the nominal interest rate to decrease the equilibrium allocation
of R&D labor. Taking the di¤erence between Rhne and R
h
 and di¤erentiating it with respect
to , we nd that
@(Rhne  Rh)
@
=
1 + h
(1 + h)2
24 1
1 
1 +h

1 + '
h


ln zh   1
  1
1
1+h

1 + '
h


ln zh   1
35 > 0.
In other words, the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal nominal interest rates is
monotonically increasing in the market power of rms. This result di¤ers from the interesting
result in Arseneau (2007), who shows that a larger market power of rms tends to reduce
the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal nominal interest rates. The di¤erent
implications between the two studies are due to the di¤erent CIA constraints. We have
analyzed a CIA constraint on R&D investment, whereas Arseneau (2007) analyzes a CIA
constraint on consumption. In the next subsection, we show that our model also delivers the
insight of Arseneau (2007) under a CIA constraint on consumption, and we will explain the
di¤erence between the two CIA constraints then.
5.3 Elastic labor supply with CIA on consumption only
In this subsection, we consider the case of elastic labor supply with the CIA constraint on
consumption. However, we remove the CIA constraint on R&D. In this case, (33) becomes
Lhr = (  1)Lhx  

'h
. (64)
Solving (34), (35), (36) and (64) yields the equilibrium labor allocations in country h, and
we can follow the same procedure to solve for the equilibrium allocations in country f . In
this case, the equilibrium allocations of fLhr ; Lh;hx ; Lh; Lfr ; Lh;fx g are given by
Lhr =
(  1)=
1 + h(1 + hRh)

1 +

'h

  
'h
, (65)
Lh;hx =
(1  )=
1 + h(1 + hRh)

1 +

'h

, (66)
Lh = 1  
h(1 + hRh)
1 + h(1 + hRh)

1 +

'h

, (67)
Lfr =
(  1)=
1 + f (1 + fRf )

1 +

'f

  
'f
, (68)
Lh;fx =
=
1 + f (1 + fRf )

1 +

'f

. (69)
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Substituting (65)-(69) into Uh in (47) and the analogous conditions in country f into U f ,
we nd that the cooperative governmentsoptimization problem yields
@(Uh + U f )
@Rh
< 0
for all values of Rh  0. Therefore, the optimal nominal interest rates are fRh ; Rfg =
f0; 0g implying that the Friedman rule33 is always optimal under the CIA constraint on
consumption.
As for the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate, we di¤erentiate Uh with respect to Rh
and nd that
@Uh
@Rh
=  
hh (1  )  1 + ='h


1 + h
 
1 + hRh
2
"
(1  )  1 + hRh  1
Lh;hx
 
1 + hRh
 + (  1)'h

ln zh
#
, (70)
where Lh;hx is given by (66). Suppose  ! 1. In this case, @Uh=@Rh > 0 when Rh = 0.
In other words, the government has incentives to choose a strictly positive nominal interest
rate. This e¤ect captures the important result of an inationary bias due to monetary policy
competition in Cooley and Quadrini (2003). Equation (70) also shows that a larger markup 
would reduce this inationary bias capturing the dampening e¤ect of monopolistic distortion
raised by Arseneau (2007). If the markup  becomes su¢ ciently large, then @Uh=@Rh < 0
for all values of Rh  0. In this case, the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate would be
also zero. We summarize these results in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 Under elastic labor supply with only a CIA constraint on consumption, the
optimal nominal interest rates are always zero. If the markup  ! 1, then the Nash-
equilibrium nominal interest rate in country h is Rhne = =[
h (1  )] > 0, which is increas-
ing in . As the markup  increases, the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates decrease.
If the markup  is su¢ ciently large, then the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates would
also be zero.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 6 together with the analysis in the previous subsection show that under the
two CIA constraints, the market power of rms has very di¤erent implications on the ina-
tionary bias from monetary policy competition. The di¤erence between the CIA constraint
on consumption and the CIA constraint on R&D is that under the latter, an increase in the
nominal interest rate leads to a reallocation of labor from R&D to production. As a result,
a positive nominal interest rate would be chosen by the government if the business-stealing
e¤ect measured by the markup  is strong. In contrast, under the CIA constraint on con-
sumption, this reallocation e¤ect is absent because an increase in the nominal interest rate
decreases both R&D and production labors. Given that the economy features an undersup-
ply of labor due to the distortion of monopolistic competition, the government would avoid
setting too high a nominal interest rate that worsens this monopolistic distortion.
33In his seminal study, Friedman (1969) argues that the optimal nominal interest rate is zero.
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6 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we provide a numerical illustration on the growth and welfare e¤ects of
monetary policy across countries. We consider the general case with elastic labor supply and
both CIA constraints on R&D and consumption. To make this quantitative analysis more
realistic, we allow for the duplication externality (i.e., fh; fg > 0) discussed in Section
3.5.34 We calibrate the model using aggregate data from 1999 to 200735 in the Euro Area
and the UK,36 which are two relatively open economies. To x notation, we consider the UK
as the home country h and the Euro Area as the foreign country f .
The two-country model features the following set of parameters f; ; ; zh; zf ; 'h; 'f ; h;
f ; h; f ; Rh; Rf ; h; fg. Given the calibrated parameter values, we then perform a counter-
factual policy experiment on the e¤ects of decreasing the nominal interest rates on economic
growth and social welfare in the two economies. The average value of imports from the Euro
Area to the UK as a percentage of GDP in the UK is 14.9%,37 and we use this empirical mo-
ment to calibrate the parameter . As for the discount rate , we consider a standard value
of  = 0:05; see for example Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012). As for the aggregate markup
in the economy, we consider  = 1:03 in accordance with the aggregate prot share of 3%
estimated by Basu (1996). The average growth rates of total factor productivity in the UK
and the Euro Area are respectively 0.9% and 0.8%,38 and we use these values to calibrate
the step-size parameters fzh; zfg. The average value of R&D expenditures as a percentage
of GDP in the UK and the Euro Area are respectively 1.8% and 1.9%,39 and we use these
values to calibrate the R&D productivity parameters f'h; 'fg. As for the leisure parameters
fh; fg, we calibrate them by setting the supply of labor fLh; Lfg to a standard value of
0.33. The ratios of M1 to GDP in the UK and the Euro Area are respectively 0.541 and
0.361,40 and we use these values to calibrate the consumption-CIA parameters fh; fg. The
average ination rates in the UK and the Euro Area are respectively 2.1% and 2.8%,41 and
we use these values to calibrate fRh; Rfg. Given these calibrated values of fRh; Rfg, we
choose fh; fg in order to set fRhne; Rfneg = fRh; Rfg. We report the parameter values in
Table 1.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
   zh zf 'h 'f h f h f Rh Rf h f
0:149 1:03 0:05 1:12 1:09 0:27 0:33 1:92 1:95 0:52 0:34 0:080 0:086 0:77 0:76
The policy experiments are as follows. First, we lower the nominal interest rates in both
economies from the Nash equilibrium to their globally optimal level and examine the e¤ects
34We present the equilibrium conditions in Appendix C.
35We do not include data from 2008 onwards due to the international nancial and debt crises.
36The analysis here focuses on the European economies. However, the two-country model can also be
calibrated to other economies.
37Data source: The OECD Database.
38Data source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database.
39Data source: Eurostat (European Commission).
40Data source: Bank of England Statistics Database and ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
41Data source: The OECD Database.
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on economic growth fgh; gfg and social welfare fUh; U fg. Second, we consider a unilateral
deviation from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal nominal interest rate that maximizes
aggregate welfare of the two economies and examine the asymmetric implications on the
two economies. Under the current set of calibrated parameter values, the optimal nominal
interest rates in both economies are zero; in other words, the Friedman rule is socially
optimal.
We rst consider the case in which the two governments are cooperative and agree to
decrease the nominal interest rates from the Nash equilibrium to the globally optimal level
of zero. In this case, the welfare gains are nonnegligible and equivalent to a permanent
increase in consumption of 0.292% in the UK and 0.443% in the Euro Area. These results
together with the growth e¤ects are reported in Table 2.42 However, a unilateral deviation
to decrease the nominal interest rate from the Nash equilibrium would hurt the domestic
economy and only benet the foreign economy, and the cross-country spillover e¤ects are
quantitatively signicantly. For example, we nd that a unilateral decrease in the nominal
interest rate Rf in the Euro Area would improve welfare in the UK by 0.347% but reduce its
own welfare by 0.028% despite a larger increase in the growth rate gf in the Euro Area than
the growth rate gh in the UK. Intuitively, a decrease in Rf raises labor supply Lf via the CIA
constraints. The resulting expansion in production in the Euro Area increases consumption
in both countries, in which the increase in consumption in the UK is via the term Lh;fx . It is
useful to note that the welfare cost of decreasing leisure is borne by the Euro Area but by not
the UK. As a result, the UK experiences a welfare gain whereas the Euro Area experiences
a welfare loss. The opposite is true when the UK unilaterally decreases Rh.
Table 2: Growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy
gh gf Uh U f
Cooperative policy (Rh = Rf = 0) 0:024% 0:022% 0:292% 0:443%
Unilateral policy (Rf = 0) 0:003% 0:019% 0:347%  0:028%
Unilateral policy (Rh = 0) 0:020% 0:004%  0:054% 0:471%
7 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy in an open-
economy version of the Schumpeterian growth model with CIA constraints on consumption
and R&D investment. We nd that economic growth and social welfare in the domestic
economy are a¤ected by both domestic and foreign monetary policies. Furthermore, the
cross-country welfare e¤ects of monetary policy are quantitatively signicant. These spillover
e¤ects give rise to positive nominal interest rates in the Nash equilibrium and could prevent
noncooperative governments from implementing optimal policies in the long run.
Finally, our analysis is based on a rst-generation R&D-based growth model that features
scale e¤ects, under which a growing population gives rise to a rising growth rate.43 We could
42Changes in the growth rate are expressed as changes in percentage points. Welfare gains are expressed
as the usual equivalent variation in consumption.
43See Jones (1999) and Laincz and Peretto (2006) for a discussion of scale e¤ects in R&D growth models.
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allow for population growth and remove scale e¤ects by introducing a dilution e¤ect as in
Chu and Cozzi (2013). Our results are robust to this modication. Nevertheless, it could
be fruitful to explore the e¤ects of monetary policy in other vintages of the Schumpeterian
growth model, such as the semi-endogenous growth version of the Schumpeterian model in
Segerstrom (1998) and the second-generation Schumpeterian growth model in Peretto (1998)
and Howitt (1999). We leave these interesting extensions to future research.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Taking the log of the free-entry condition 'hV ht = (1 + R
h)W ht
in the R&D sector and then di¤erentiating it with respect to t yield
_V ht
V ht
=
_W ht
W ht
. (A1)
Substituting (23) and then (5) into (A1) yields
  _
h
t
ht
+ ht  
!ht
V ht
=
_W ht
W ht
, (A2)
where ht = '
hLhr;t from (25). Taking the log of (3) and di¤erentiating with respect to t yield
  _
h
t
ht
=
_P ht
P ht
+
_Cht
Cht
. (A3)
Substituting the balanced-trade condition P h;ft Y
h;f
t = EtP f;ht Y f;ht into (21) and (22) yields
!ht =
  1


P h;ht Y
h;h
t + P
h;f
t Y
h;f
t

=
  1

P ht C
h
t , (A4)
W ht L
h
x;t =
1


P h;ht Y
h;h
t + P
h;f
t Y
h;f
t

=
1

P ht C
h
t , (A5)
where the second equality of (A4) and (A5) applies (7) and (8). Taking the log of (A5) and
di¤erentiating it with respect to t yield
_W ht
W ht
=
_P ht
P ht
+
_Cht
Cht
 
_Lhx;t
Lhx;t
. (A6)
Substituting (A3) and (A6) into (A2) and then rearranging terms yield
_Lhx;t
Lhx;t
=
!ht
V ht
  'hLhr;t   . (A7)
Substituting 'hV ht = (1 +R
h)W ht , (A4) and (A5) into (A7) yields
1
'h
_Lhx;t
Lhx;t
=
  1
1 +Rh
Lhx;t   Lhr;t  

'h
, (A8)
where Lhr;t = L
h
t   Lhx;t from the resource constraint. Substituting (A5) into (4) yields
Lht = 1  h(1 + hRh)Lhx;t. (A9)
Substituting (A9) into the resource constraint on labor yields
Lhr;t = 1  h(1 + hRh)Lhx;t   Lhx;t. (A10)
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Substituting (A10) into (A8) and then rearranging terms yield
_Lhx;t = '
hLhx;t

+Rh
1 +Rh
+ h(1 + hRh)

Lhx;t  

1 +

'h

, (A11)
which is a one-dimensional di¤erential equation in Lhx;t. Drawing _L
h
x;t as a function of L
h
x;t
on a phase diagram, one can easily show that the dynamics of Lhx;t is characterized by
saddle-point stability such that Lhx;t must jump to its interior steady-state value, which in
turn implies that Lht and L
h
r;t also jump to their steady-state values according to (A9) and
(A10). An analogous proof would show that labor allocations in country f also jump to their
steady-state values.
Proof of Proposition 2. Setting _Lhx;t = 0 in (A11) yields the steady-state value of L
h
x;t
given by
Lhx =
1 +Rh
+Rh + h(1 + hRh)(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

. (A12)
Substituting (A12) into (33) and rearranging terms yield the steady-state value of Lhr;t in
(37). Similarly, substituting (A12) into (34) yields the steady-state value of Lht in (40).
Finally, we combine Lh;hx + L
f;h
x = L
h
x and (36) to derive the steady-state values of L
h;h
x and
Lf;hx in (38) and (39).
Proof of Proposition 4. The analogous expression of (47) for U f is given by
U f = (1 ) lnLf;fx + lnLf;hx +
(1  )('f ln zf )

Lfr +
('h ln zh)

Lhr +
f ln(1 Lf ). (A13)
The analogous expressions of (37)-(40) in country f are
Lfr =
  1
+Rf + f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

  
'f
, (A14)
Lf;fx = (1  )Lfx =
(1  )(1 +Rf )
+Rf + f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

, (A15)
Lh;fx = L
f
x =
(1 +Rf )
+Rf + f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

, (A16)
Lf = 1  
f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )
+Rf + f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

. (A17)
Under inelastic labor supply, we set h = f = 0 in (37)-(40) and (A14)-(A17). Then, we
substitute the resulting expressions into Uh + U f from (47) and (A13) and di¤erentiate it
with respect to fRh; Rfg to obtain the optimal nominal interest rates given by
Rh = max

  
h

h   1 ; 0

, (A18)
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Rf = max

  
f

f   1 ; 0

, (A19)
where 
h  (1 + 'h=) ln zh > 1 and 
f  (1 + 'f=) ln zf > 1. Therefore, fRh ; Rfg =
fRhne; Rfneg in (53) and (54). As for the comparative statics, Rh is decreasing in 
h, which in
turn is increasing in 'h and zh but decreasing in . Similarly, Rf is decreasing in 

f , which
in turn is increasing in 'f and zf but decreasing in .
Proof of Proposition 5. In the absence of the CIA constraint on consumption, we
set h = f = 0 in (37)-(40) and (A14)-(A17). The government in country h chooses Rh
to maximize the welfare of the representative household in country h. We substitute (37),
(38), (40), (A14) and (A16) under h = f = 0 into Uh in (47) and then di¤erentiate it
with respect to Rh to obtain the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate Rhne in country h
given by (60). Similarly, the government in country f chooses Rf to maximize the welfare
of the representative household in country f . We substitute (A14), (A15), (A17), (37) and
(39) under h = f = 0 into U f in (A13) and then di¤erentiate it with respect to Rf to
obtain the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate Rfne in country f given by (61). As for
the comparative statics, Rhne in (60) is decreasing in 
h, which in turn is decreasing in ;
therefore, Rhne is increasing in . Similarly, R
f
ne in (61) is decreasing in 
f , which in turn
is also decreasing in ; therefore, Rfne is also increasing in . The cooperative governments
choose fRh; Rfg to maximize the welfare of both domestic and foreign households. We set
h = f = 0 in (37)-(40) and (A14)-(A17) and substitute the resulting expressions into
Uh + U f from (47) and (A13). Then, we di¤erentiate Uh + U f with respect to fRh; Rfg to
obtain the optimal nominal interest rates given by (62) and (63), in which 	h and 	f are
both independent of .
Proof of Proposition 6. In the absence of the CIA constraint on R&D, the equilibrium
labor allocations fLhr ; Lh;hx ; Lh; Lfr ; Lh;fx g are given by (65)-(69). For the Nash-equilibrium
nominal interest rate Rhne in country h, we substitute (65)-(69) into U
h in (47) and then
di¤erentiate it with respect to Rh. We nd that
@Uh
@Rh
=  
hh (1  )  1 + ='h


1 + h
 
1 + hRh
2
"
(1  )  1 + hRh  1
Lh;hx
 
1 + hRh
 + (  1)'h

ln zh
#
. (A20)
Equation (A20) shows that as  ! 1, the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate is Rhne =
=[h (1  )] > 0, which is increasing in . Furthermore, if  is su¢ ciently large, then
@Uh=@Rh < 0 for all values of Rh; in this case, Rhne = 0. The analogous expressions of
(65)-(69) for fLfr ; Lf;fx ; Lf ; Lhr ; Lf;hx g are
Lfr =
(  1)=
1 + f (1 + fRf )

1 +

'f

  
'f
, (A21)
Lf;fx =
(1  )=
1 + f (1 + fRf )

1 +

'f

, (A22)
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Lf = 1  
f (1 + fRf )
1 + f (1 + fRf )

1 +

'f

, (A23)
Lhr =
(  1)=
1 + h(1 + hRh)

1 +

'h

  
'h
, (A24)
Lf;hx =
=
1 + h(1 + hRh)

1 +

'h

. (A25)
For the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate Rfne in country f , we substitute (A21)-(A25)
into U f in (A13) and di¤erentiate it with respect to Rf . We nd that
@U f
@Rf
=  
ff (1  )  1 + ='f


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 
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2
"
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 
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 + (  1)'f

ln zf
#
. (A26)
Equation (A26) shows that as  ! 1, the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate is Rfne =
=[f (1  )] > 0, which is increasing in . Furthermore, if  is su¢ ciently large, then
@U f=@Rf < 0 for all values of Rf ; in this case, Rfne = 0. As for the optimal nominal
interest rates fRh ; Rfg, we add Uh from (47) and U f from (A13) and substitute (65)-(69)
and (A21)-(A25) into Uh + U f . Then, we di¤erentiate Uh + U f with respect to fRh; Rfg
and nd that
@(Uh + U f )
@Rh
=  hh
"
hRh
1 + h
 
1 + hRh
  
1 + hRh
 + (  1)  1 + 'h= ln zh


1 + h
 
1 + hRh
2
#
< 0,
(A27)
@(Uh + U f )
@Rf
=  ff
"
fRf
1 + f
 
1 + fRf
  
1 + fRf
 + (  1)  1 + 'f= ln zf


1 + f
 
1 + fRf
2
#
< 0.
(A28)
Therefore, given the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rates, it must be the case that
fRh ; Rfg = f0; 0g.
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Appendix B
In this appendix, we show the conditions under which f
h;
f ;	h;	f ;h;fg > 1. First,
we derive the rst-best allocations of labor. Combining (47) and (A13) yields
(Uh + U f ) = (1  )(lnLh;hx + lnLf;fx ) + (lnLh;fx + lnLf;hx ) +
'h ln zh

Lhr +
'f ln zf

Lfr
+h ln(1  Lh) + f ln(1  Lf ). (B1)
The social planner maximizes (B1) subject to the following resource constraints:
Lh;hx + L
f;h
x + L
h
r = L
h, (B2)
Lf;fx + L
h;f
x + L
f
r = L
f . (B3)
The rst-best optimal allocations of R&D labor and labor supply in country h are
Lhr = 1 
(1 + h)
'h ln zh
> 0, (B4)
The parameter restriction on Lhr > 0 implies 	
h > 1. To see this result, from (63),
	h > 1,

1 +
'h


ln zh
1 + h
> 1. (B5)
From (B4), we see that
Lhr > 0,

'h


ln zh
1 + h
> 1. (B6)
Therefore, if Lhr > 0, then 	
h > 1. An analogous procedure in country f would show that if
Lfr > 0, then 	
f > 1. In the case of inelastic labor supply, we have

h > 1,

1 +
'h


ln zh > 1, (B7)
Lhr jh=0 > 0,

'h


ln zh > 1. (B8)
Therefore, if Lhr jh=0 > 0, then 
h > 1. An analogous procedure for country f would show
that if Lfr jf=0 > 0, then 
f > 1.
In the rest of this appendix, we consider the following alternative maximization problem:
a social planner representing only country h unilaterally maximizes
Uh = (1 ) lnLh;hx + lnLh;fx +
(1  )('h ln zh)

Lhr +
('f ln zf )

Lfr + 
h ln(1 Lh) (B9)
subject to (B2) and the equilibrium condition in (36), which ensures that Lf;hx and L
h;f
x are
positive. In this case, the planners allocation of R&D labor in country h is
Lhr = 1 
(1   + h)
(1  )('h ln zh) > 0. (B10)
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The parameter restriction on Lhr > 0 implies 
h > 1. To see this result, from (60),
h > 1, 1  
1   + h

1 +
'h


ln zh > 1. (B11)
From (B10), we see that
Lhr > 0,
1  
1   + h

'h


ln zh > 1. (B12)
Therefore, if Lhr > 0, then 
h > 1. An analogous procedure in country f would show that if
Lfr > 0, then 
f > 1.
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Appendix C
In this appendix, we provide the equilibrium conditions for the general version of the
model with duplication externality in R&D, where h 2 (0; 1) is the duplication externality
parameter. Under h 2 (0; 1), (33) becomes
Lhr =
  1
1 +Rh
Lhx  

'h
(Lhr )
h . (C1)
Equations (C1), (34) and (35) solve fLhr ; Lh; Lhxg. Then, (36) and Lh;hx + Lf;hx = Lhx solve
fLh;hx ; Lf;hx g. There is a set of analogous equations in country f . Using (C1), (34) and (35),
one can show that R&D labor Lhr satises the following condition:
Lhr +

'h
(Lhr )
h =
  1
1 +Rh
1  Lhr
1 + h(1 + hRh)
, (C2)
which implicitly determines the unique equilibrium value of Lhr . A simple graphical analysis
shows that @Lhr=@R
h < 0. Furthermore, we have @Lhr=@R
f = 0. By analogous inference, one
can show that @Lfr=@R
f < 0 and @Lfr=@R
h = 0.
The steady-state equilibrium growth rate of consumption goods Cht in country h is
gh 
_Cht
Cht
= (1  )
_Zht
Zht
+ 
_Zft
Zft
= (1  )('h ln zh)(Lhr )1 
h
+ ('f ln zf )(Lfr )
1 f . (C3)
Di¤erentiating (C3) with respect to Rh yields
@gh
@Rh
= (1  )(1  h)('h ln zh)(Lhr;t) 
h @Lhr
@Rh
< 0, (C4)
which shows that the growth rate of consumption goods in country h is decreasing in the
domestic nominal interest rate Rh. Di¤erentiating (C3) with respect to Rf yields
@gh
@Rf
= (1  f )('f ln zf )(Lfr;t) 
f @Lfr
@Rf
< 0, (C5)
which shows that gh is also decreasing in the foreign nominal interest rate Rf . One can also
obtain analogous results for the growth rate of consumption goods in country f .
Social welfare in country h in (47) can be reexpressed as
Uh = (1  ) lnLh;hx +  lnLh;fx +
gh

+ h ln(1  Lh), (C6)
where @Lh;fx =@R
h = 0. Using (C6), one can show that the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest
rate in country h is implicitly determined by the following condition:

@Uh
@Rh
=
1  
Lh;hx
@Lh;hx
@Rh
+
1

@gh
@Rh
  
h
1  Lh
@Lh
@Rh
= 0. (C7)
There is also an analogous condition that implicitly determines the Nash-equilibrium nominal
interest rate in country f .
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